This paper studies the implications of labor taxation in determining the sensitivity of an economy to macroeconomic shocks. We construct a New Keynesian business cycle model with matching frictions of the labor market, where sluggish employment adjustment implies a key role for labor markets in determining shock propagation. We consider three policy instruments to analyze the steady state and dynamic e¤ects of tax reforms: the marginal tax rate and replacement ratio amplify shock responses whereas employment subsidies weaken them. The tax instruments a¤ect the degree to which the wage absorbs shocks. We show that the relative e¤ects of the tax instruments and thus the e¤ects of tax progression are sensitive to the initial degree of tax progression in the economy. Increasing tax progression when taxation is initially progressive is harmful for steady state employment and output, and ampli…es the sesitivity of macroeconomic variables to shocks. When taxation is initially proportional, increasing progression is bene-…cial for output and employment and dampens shock responses of macroeconomic variables.
Introduction
The design of tax and labor market policy may be motivated by a number of objectives, such as collecting tax revenue, promoting income equality, guaranteeing minimum income to relatively disadvantaged workers or reducing unemployment. The trade-o¤s faced by policy makers to achieve the desired goals may di¤er according to the institutional setup of the economy as well as the equilibrium levels of macroeconomic variables such as output, unemployment or job turnover. As economies are not isolated in their steady state, events such as technology or monetary policy shocks shake the economy from time to time out of the steady state equilibrium. The way the economy responds to these shocks depends on the steady state of the economy, which is shaped by tax policies. Accordingly, another concern of policy makers when designing the structure of taxation are the implied economic dynamics and sensitivity of the economy to exogenous shocks.
The purpose of this paper is to study the e¤ects of labor taxation on shock propagation in a monetary business cycle model. We construct a New Keynesian business cycle model which incorporates matching frictions of the labor market à la Mortensen-Pissarides (e.g. Pissarides 2000, Mortensen and Pissarides 1999a) to introduce real rigidity into the monetary model. The model incorporates three labor market policy instruments: a marginal income tax, a tax subsidy for employed workers and a replacement ratio for unemployed workers. The marginal income tax and employment subsidy jointly determine the degree of progression in income taxation and the replacement ratio determines the income when unemployed (in addition to the value of home production or leisure). With these tax policy tools, we study how income taxation a¤ects the steady state equilibrium of the economy and how taxation transmits to the sensitivity of the economy to macroeconomic shocks.
A recent body of literature has explored the role of real rigidities of the labor market in business cycle models by combining the search-matching framework of the labor market to real business cycle models (Merz 1995 , Andolfatto 1996 , den Haan et al. 2000 and the New Keynesian monetary model (Walsh 2003 , Trigari 2004 , Krause and Lubik 2005) . These studies have been successful in improving the performance of business cycle models in generating shock persistence in macroeconomic variables observed in the data. A key feature of these models is that they introduce employment adjustment in business cycle models through changes in the number of employed workers (the extensive margin) instead of in the number of hours (the intensive margin). This, combined with search frictions of the labor market, generates involuntary unemployment and sluggish employment adjustment into the business cy-cle models. The rigidity in the adjustment of labor has proved to be of essence in generating persistence into the business cycle models.
In a search labor market, the equilibrium labor market variables depend on the incentives for …rms to create vacancies, on workers valuation of employment relative to unemployment and the decisions of …rms and workers to separate when outside opportunities are more attractive. These depend on how well the matching market works, but also on the institutional features of the economy that determine the relative values of di¤erent labor market states. Indeed, the search-matching literature (e.g. Pissarides 1998 , 2000 , Mortensen and Pissarides 2003 has demonstrated how labor market policy, e.g. taxes, in ‡uences equilibrium labor market variables: unemployment, wages, labor market tightness, job creation rate and job destruction. A natural extension of this work is to ask whether the e¤ects of the tax structure on the labor market equilibrium is of relevance in determining the sensitivity of the economy to exogenous shocks.
We show that individual tax policy instruments have well-de…ned comparative static and dynamic e¤ects. In steady state, the marginal tax and replacement ratio dampen economic activity whereas the tax subsidy stimulates it. Higher marginal tax rates and replacement ratios amplify shock responses both in terms of peak e¤ects and persistence whereas higher tax subsidies dampen the impulse responses. These clear cut results abstract from any tax revenue questions, so we proceed to study the e¤ects of tax revenue neutral changes in tax progression with alternative assumptions on the initial tax scheme of the economy.
Although the e¤ects of tax progression are by no means a novel area of research, the literature is all but conclusive on the subject. Koskela and Vilmunen (1996) refer to the 'widely held popular belief that the more progressive the tax system is, the greater the disincentive to work e¤ ort'. Their analysis shows that under plausible assumptions increased tax progression lowers wages and unemployment in three trade union models of the labor market; the monopoly union, the 'right-to-manage' and the e¢ cient bargain model. They conclude that the e¤ects of taxation appear to be very sensitive to the structure of labor markets. Indeed, Pissarides (1998) studies the e¤ects of employment tax cuts on unemployment and wages in four di¤erent equilibrium models of the labor market: competitive, union bargaining, search and e¢ ciency wages. He points out that there is no de…nitive model of the European labor market and shows that e¤ects of changes in the structure and level of taxation sometimes depends on the underlying model of the labor market. He …nds that when wages are determined by bargaining, a revenue neutral increase in tax progression reduces unemployment in steady state. In a more general setting with endogenous job destruction Sinko (2005) obtains qualitatively similar results. Mortensen and Pissarides (2003) consider various tax and subsidy e¤ects on wages and unemployment. They study policies that drive the labor market closer to 'e¢ ciency'in terms of search frictions but they do not explicitly address tax progression schemes. Their calibrations show that the tightness to which the labor market is calibrated matters for the steady state outcomes. The interaction between shocks and institutions in a matching model is studied in Mortensen and Pissarides (1999b), but their focus is in unemployment compensation and employment protection policies.
We take new steps by analyzing the importance of the initial tax scheme on tax progression e¤ects in a general equilibrium framework and taking a look at the dynamics of the model. We show that the e¤ects of tax revenue neutral changes in tax progression depend crucially on the initial degree of tax progression in the labor market. When taxation is set to be progressive in the initial state (our benchmark case), we show that the e¤ect of the marginal tax on labor market variables dominates the tax subsidy e¤ect. In steady state this implies that a 'lower activity economy' i.e. lower output and employment. The dynamic responses to exogenous shocks are ampli…ed by tax progression. When we set taxation to be proportional in the initial state, we obtain qualitatively similar results to Pissarides (1998) and Sinko (2005) .
When taxation is initially proportional, increasing progression is bene…cial for output and employment and dampens shock responses of macroeconomic variables. This is so because the relative strengths of the two tax e¤ects are reversed when the tax subsidy is su¢ ciently small. Thus we …nd that a government tax revenue neutral change in tax progression has opposite e¤ects on the steady state and shock responses depending on the degree of tax progression in the initial steady state.
The structure of this study is as follows. In section 2, we construct a New Keynesian model which incorporates matching frictions of the labor market and the tax policy instruments. Section 3 characterizes and solves the steady state of the model and presents the linearized system of equations. The model calibration is discussed in section 4. In section 5 we …rst analyze the e¤ects of labor market policy on the steady state of the model at some length, as this reveals intuition and the mechanisms that drive the dynamics of the model. Thereafter consider the dynamic responses to shocks for various tax policy regimes. Section 6 summarizes and discusses paths for further research.
Model
The model economy follows the structure of Trigari (2004) and Walsh (2003 Walsh ( , 2005 by incorporating a Mortensen-Pissarides type of labor market with matching frictions into a New Keynesian monetary model. The two main driving forces of the model's dynamics are nominal rigidities in price setting and matching frictions. A characteristic feature of the model is the separation of …rms into two types, each type taking account of one type of rigidity. This separation is made to separate the nominal rigidities from the real rigidities, thus making the model more tractable. The economy consists of the following:
Households-Households supply labor, purchase goods for consumption and hold bonds. Labor is supplied at the extensive margin, so adjustment in the labor market takes place through additional employed workers rather than varying the hours of work. We consider the households as extended families who pool consumption. This assumption is conventional and is made to avoid distributional issues. Households own the …rms in the economy.
Firms-There are two types of pro…t maximizing …rms: wholesale and retail …rms. Government-The government raises tax revenue by levying an income tax from employed workers. The tax revenue is used to …nance unemployment bene…ts, tax subsidies paid to workers and other government expenditures.
Households
There is a continuum of households on the unit interval in a discrete-time economy.
The representative household maximizes the expected present discounted utility
where C t = C t + h; and C t is the consumption of a market purchased composite good.
The composite good consists of the di¤erentiated goods produced by the retail …rms. 1 h is nontradable home production and is an indicator function taking the value of 1 The composite good wil be de…ned below.
zero when an individual is employed and one otherwise. The utility function allows for habit persistence. As monetary policy is represented by an interest rate rule and our focus is not on the stock of money, we consider a limit economy where the weight of the utility of the household's holdings of real money balances approaches zero in the utility function. 2 The households budget constraint is
where D t is the family income which consists of wage income, unemployment income and family share of …rms pro…ts. B t is the household's nominal holdings of bonds and P t is the retail price index. Using (1) and (2) we can derive the …rst-order condition
which is the household's Euler condition, where 
Wholesale …rms and labor market search

Match productivity and job ‡ows
To keep the model simple we assume that labor is the only input in the production of intermediate goods. Match productivity is given by
where a it is match speci…c productivity and z t is a common aggregate productivity 
where u t and v t are unemployed workers and open vacancies at time t respectively, 0 < < 1 and A > 0 is a shift parameter. 3 The hazard rates for a …rm of meeting a worker and a worker of meeting a …rm are respectively
where t = vt ut is labor market tightness. The tighter the labor market, the easier it is for the worker to …nd a partner and harder for a …rm to …nd a partner. Thus q f t is decreasing and q w t is increasing in t : Jobs are destroyed due to exogenous shocks and endogenous separation decisions of …rms and workers. Exogenous shocks arrive at rate x at the beginning of each period.
For the matches that survive, the …rm and worker jointly observe the realization of match productivity and decide whether to continue or destroy the match. Jobs with a productivity realization that is below a reservation productivityã t are destroyed.
Endogenous job destruction is then
and the aggregate separation rate is
With job creation and destruction characterized as above, the number of matches (employment) that enter period t is
where n t is period t employment. The measure of searching workers is
The number of searching workers in period t di¤ers from the number of unemployed workers, 1 n; in the beginning of period t as some of the employed workers separate from their matches and start searching for a new job within the same period.
Furthermore, we determine the net job creation rate. Each period q f t v t vacancies are …lled. Of these vacancies a fraction x is immediately destroyed exogenously. The rate of turnover is then q f t x n t and the net job creation rate can be expressed as
Employment taxes and unemployment income
From the variety of possible tax policy schemes we will focus on income taxation and unemployment bene…ts. 4 Taxes on labor income and unemployment earnings are modeled in a simple manner by using three policy instruments: a marginal tax on total labor earnings, a tax subsidy for employed workers and unemployment compensation. We assume that wage taxes are linear and smooth functions of income. In our benchmark case employed workers receive a tax subsidy and are subsequently taxed for their total earnings, the subsidy included, at proportional rate (s:t: 0 1) : 5 The net income of a worker with match speci…c productivity a it is then
where w it (a it z t ) is the wage of a worker with match-speci…c productivity a it . The transfer from the worker to the tax authorities is
When the tax subsidy is positive, taxation is progressive s.t. the average tax rate increases with the wage. When = 0 taxation is proportional.
Unemployment compensation is modeled to be a policy determined replacement ratio of net income. 6 As there is a distribution of wages, one possibility would be to set 4 We abstract from other policy aspects such as employment protection or promotion through …ring costs and hiring subsidies respectively, or the role of payroll taxes. 5 The benchmark labor market policy setup follows Pissarides (2000) , but in the analysis that follows we will consider departures from these assumptions. 6 This is not the case in all European countries. Therefore a replacement ratio that is proportional to the gross wage will also be considered below.
the unemployment compensation proportional to the average net wage. To simplify the model we use instead average productivity and assume that the unemployment compensation is proportional to the sum of the average productivity and the tax subsidy.
The unemployment compensation is then
where is the replacement rate and
This setup e¤ectively implies that the unemployment bene…t is subject to the marginal tax rate.
Match surplus and value functions
Match surplus is a key element in determining job creation and destruction. The surplus is the di¤erence of the values of being matched and the outside values and is given by
where J t (a it ) and W t (a it ) are the values for a …rm and worker respectively of being matched and V t and U t are the values of idleness for the worker and …rm, that is having an open vacancy for the …rm and being unemployed for the worker.
Firm The value for a …rm of a …lled job J t (a it ) and a vacancy V t are given by
The value of a …lled job is determined by the real value of match output a it zt t (in terms of of time t consumption goods) minus the wage w t (a it z t ) paid to the worker, and the expected future value of the job, which is discounted according to the discount
The wage paid by the …rm includes the taxes the worker pays to the government. The expected value of the job takes into account that the job may be destroyed due to an exogenous shock with probability x and that jobs with a productivity realization a it+1 <ã t+1 will be destroyed endogenously.
The value of having an open vacancy consists of the periodical cost of having
an open vacancy and the expected surplus of a …lled job. The latter depends on the probability q f t of …nding an appropriate worker, and that the job is not destroyed due to an exogenous shock or endogenously due to a low realization of match speci…c productivity. We assume free-entry of …rms to the market so …rms enter until V t = 0:
Substituting the free-entry condition into (15) 
The job creation equation states that the expected surplus for the …rm must equal the cost of posting a vacancy. The right hand side of the equation gives the expected surplus that accrues to the …rm from a …lled job. The left hand side is the expected cost of …lling the vacancy, where q f t is the probability of the …rm …nding a worker so
Worker The values for the worker of employment W t (a it ) and unemployment U t are
An employed worker earns a wage of w t (a it z t ) and makes a transfer T (w t (a it z t )) to the tax authorities. The expected value of employment depends on the probability of not being destroyed by an exogenous shock and that the match speci…c productivity realization satis…es a it+1 ã t : In the case of destruction the worker enjoys the value of unemployment U t+1 : An unemployed worker enjoys the value of leisure (or home production) h and an unemployment compensation b t (w e t (H (ã t ) z t )) ; which was de…ned above. The probabilities and values of being employed or unemployed next period a¤ect the value of unemployment in the current period.
Bargaining and the wage
The wage is determined by Nash bargaining as is conventional in the matching literature. The match surplus is shared between the …rm and the worker according to the parameter which represents the workers share (bargaining power) of the match surplus. The wage rate satis…es 7
The …rst order condition is
and implies the following relations
These relations show how the share parameter increases the relative share of match surplus going to the worker. From these relations we also see that increasing the marginal tax rate T 0 (w t (a it z t )) = has similar e¤ects to the division of surplus as a decrease in the share parameter. The higher is the marginal tax rate, the lower is the worker's share of surplus relative to the …rm's. Substituting the value equations into the …rst order condition (20) and rearranging produces the wage equation 8
In addition to the real value of the marginal product a it zt t of the match, the wage depends on the cost related to search in the case of separation as well as the outside value of the worker. The wage is increasing in labor market tightness t which re ‡ects the ease with which a worker can …nd an alternative employer in the case of separation.
The higher the value of home production h, the higher is the required wage for the worker to agree to work. The wage is increasing in the bargaining share of the worker.
The partial comparative statics of the wage wrt. the policy parameters are @w t @ > 0, @w t @ < 0; @w t @ > 0:
A higher replacement rate raises the worker's unemployment income and threat point in the wage bargain, thus raising the wage. The tax subsidy paid to an employed worker reduces the negotiated wage. This is because the cost of labor to the …rm is reduced as the worker's employment is partly compensated by the tax subsidy. As the wage is bargained for, the …rm and worker share the subsidy in the same way as they share the surplus of the job. The net gain from the subsidy received upon job formation is (1 ) : employed workers receive the full subsidy , but as unemployment is proportional to net income (including the subsidy), they already received a fraction of it in their unemployment bene…t. The marginal tax reduces 8 Note that this is the gross wage that the …rm pays to a worker while the worker's after tax net wage is wt (aitzt) T (wt (aitzt)) = (1 ) [wt (aitzt) + ] :
the worker's share of match surplus. From any increase in the wage conceded by the …rm, the worker receives only a fraction 1 ; so there is a joint loss to the …rm and worker from the marginal tax. As the value of unemployment includes the value of home production which is not taxed, the marginal tax increases this value relative to the value of working. Thus the marginal tax increases the gross wage.
A government tax revenue neutral increase in tax revenue may be implemented by increasing the marginal tax and making the necessary increase in the tax subsidy to exhaust the change in tax revenue. The e¤ect on the wage is a priori ambiguous as the two tax policy instruments a¤ect the wage in opposite directions. The parameters of the second term in the wage equation (23)determine the relative e¤ects of an increase in the two tax inxtruments. The size of the relative e¤ects will be of key importance to the general equilibrium e¤ects of the model.
For the purposes of the present study it may be intuitive to see the wage as consisting of market and nonmarket components. The …rst term in (23) consists of variables that re ‡ect market conditions, match productivity and labor market tightness. The wage responds to changes and volatility in the labor market through this term. The second term consists of non market or …xed parameters. The larger is this part of the wage relative to the market part, the more rigid is the wage. The relative importance of these two terms determines how much of exogenous shocks are absorbed by the wage.
The more rigid the wage is, the more the shocks are transferred on to the pro…tability of jobs and thus on job creation and destruction.
To illustrate this, consider two extreme cases of the wage negotiation outcome, namely approaching solutions where one of the partners has all of the bargaining power. When the worker's bargaining power approaches unity ( ! 1) the second term in the wage equation approaches zero and the wage equation becomes
Now there are no …xed components of the wage and it consists only of 'market terms'making it more sensitive to market disturbances. The whole of the real value of the marginal product a it zt t of the match accrues to the worker and the value of unemployment becomes irrelevant. The worker can appropriate all of the match surplus.
The policy parameters have no in ‡uence in this extreme case.
In the other extreme the …rm has all bargaining power ( ! 0) and the wage equation reduces to
where the match product and the the ease at which new partners are found have no relevance. The wage is now immune to market disturbances but the policy parameters have a key in ‡uence on the wage. In this cas the match surplus goes entirely to the …rm and the wage paid to workers will be only as high as the value of leisure and unemployment compensation. Here the policy parameters have qualtatively similar, but more important, e¤ects on the wage as in the basic case.
Job creation and destruction
To derive (relatively) explicit expressions for job creation and destruction we …rst manipulate the value equation for a …lled job following Pissarides (2000, ch. 2). Substitute the wage equation into the value equation for a …lled job (14) to get
Evaluate this expression at a it =ã t and subtract the resulting equation from (24) after noting that J t (ã t ) = 0 by the de…nition of reservation productivity (jobs are destroyed when match surplus goes to zero). 9 We obtain
Substituting this into the job creation condition (16) we get
This condition restates the condition that the …rm's share of expected surplus must equal the job creation cost. From the partial comparative statics we see that the job creation condition of intermediate good …rms depends negatively on labor market tightness t (through q f t ), positively on the reservation valueã for match speci…c productivity, positively on general productivity z t and negatively on the price markup t of retail …rms.
Jobs are destroyed when match surplus is zero, J t (ã it ) = 0: Setting (24) to equal zero and substituting the job creation condition for the second row we obtain and using the job creation condition (??) we obtaiñ
We now see from (26) and (27) that the policy instruments are present only in the job destruction condition. 9 The …rm and worker agree when to separate as Jt (ait) = 0 implies Wt (ait) Ut = 0 by the Nash bargaining rule. Therefore we may consider job destruction from either the …rm's or worker's perspective.
Aggregate output and consumption
The aggregate output of the economy produced by all …rm-worker matches is given by
where H (ã t ) as the conditional expectation E [a j a ã t ] : Finally, we also require that consumption C t equals aggregate household income Y t which equals production net of vacancy costs
Retail …rms and price rigidity
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive retail …rms on the unit interval.
Retail …rms buy output of wholesale …rms at price P W t , di¤erentiate the good and sell it to households. No other inputs or costs are used in the production of …nal goods, thus retail …rm's marginal cost is P W t and real marginal cost is P W t Pt : Output sold by retail …rm j is y jt at price p jt : Final goods y t are a composite of individual retail goods
where " > 1 is the the elasticity of substitution across the di¤erentiated retail goods.
If resources are used e¢ ciently output of good j equals the demand (consumption) of good j, y jt = c jt so we have
The demand for good j can be written as
where the price elasticity of good j is ": As " ! 1, the goods become closer substitutes and …rms have less market power. chosen …rms adjusts its price optimally each period and a fraction ! adjusts according to a rule of thumb. 10 Optimally adjusting …rms set their price to maximize the expected discounted value of current and future pro…ts and all adjusting …rms choose the same price p : Pro…ts at a future date t + i are a¤ected by the price chosen at date t if the …rm has not had the possibility to update its price optimally after t: The probability of this is ! i : Firms choose p jt to maximize
where t+i = i t+i t . Using the demand curve (30) faced by the …rm to eliminate c jt from the objective function and substituting
The …rst order condition is after some manipulation 11
This equation gives the price chosen by the …rms that adjust their price optimally.
The aggregate price is given by
where a fraction (1 !) adjusts price optimally and a fraction ! adjusts according to rule of thumb. We assume that …rm j uses a rule of thumb based on the most recently observed rate of in ‡ation and the most recently observed price level P t 1 ,
To obtain an expression for aggregate in ‡ation, equations (33) and (34) can be approximated around a zero average in ‡ation steady state equilibrium. We obtain
and^ t is the deviation of the price markup from the steady state value.
Monetary authority
The central bank controls the nominal rate of interest according to a policy rule that is a modi…ed Taylor rule. The short-term nominal interest rate follows the process
where R is the degree of interest rate smoothing, > 1 is the response coe¢ cient for in ‡ation and t is a serially uncorrelated, mean zero stochastic process. With this policy rule for the nominal rate of interest, the nominal quantity of money adjusts endogenously to satisfy the demand for money.
Government tax revenue
The government levies income taxes from workers to …nance unemployment bene…ts and tax subsidies paid to workers. The government tax revenues are given by
where T [w e t (H (ã t ) z t )] and b t (H (ã t ) z t ) are given by (11) and (12) respectively. The government receives tax payments (marginal tax on gross income net of the tax subsidy) from all employed workers whose jobs are not destroyed in the current period. The unemployed workers receive an unemployment compensation from the government.
Model solution and dynamics
In steady state we have t = 0 and p t = P t = P and z t = z = 1: This implies that the household's Euler condition reduces to R = 1 and the steady state values of n; ; u; q f ; q w ; jc; ; w;ã; C and the policy variables T R; T and b are given by the steady state versions of equations (4) ; (5) ; (7) ; (8) ; (9) ; (10) ; (26) ; (23) ; (27) ; (29) ; (38) ; (11) and (12) : 12 We proceed by …rst solving the non-stochastic zero-in ‡ation steady state and then linearizing the model around this steady state to simulate the dynamics of the model. The variables are expressed in terms of percentage deviations around the steady state.
The Euler condition from household's problem
Survival rate of matches ' t = 1
where e F;a = @F (ã) @ãã F (ã) :
Employment (evolution of number of matches) n t+1
Unemployment (number of unemployed job seekers u t )
Probability of …lling vacancy for …rm q f
Equality of …rms …lling vacancies and workers …nding jobŝ
The nominal interest rate rulê
In ‡ation^
where e H;a = @H(ã) @ãã H(ã) :
Endogenous job creation
Endogenous job destruction
The baseline parameter values are calibrated to a stylized U.S. economy and to be in line with previous literature. 13 As information on all parameters is not available, we calibrate these values indirectly as residual parameters from the steady state equations.
The model's parameters can be separated into six groups: labor market parameters, labor market policy parameters, household preferences, parameters characterizing the degree of price rigidity, interest rate parameters and the parameters of exogenous shocks.
Labor market-Job ‡ows are determined by the matching and separation probabilities of …rms and workers. We set the time period to one quarter and the job …nding rate of workers and the rate of …lling vacancies at q w = 0:6 and q f = 0:7 respectively. The matching function parameters are set to = 0:4 for the worker's elasticity parameter and 1 = 0:6 for the …rm's elasticity parameter. These are in accordance with empirical studies of the matching function. 14 The size of the labor force is normalized to one and the employment rate is set to n = 0:94; which implies an unemployment rate of 6 percent. The steady-state number of workers searching for a job is then u = 0:154; as u also includes the total n of workers who move to the matching market because their matches dissolve before production is started. The total job destruction rate is set to = 0:1 which is roughly consistent with a large body of empirical studies. 15 of home production in such a way that we obtain steady state values that are roughly consistent with Walsh (2003 Walsh ( , 2005 for reasonable tax parameter values. Our strategy is to …rst set the policy parameters to benchmark values s.t. taxation is initially progressive and the replacement ratio similar to examples of the U.S. used in the literature. We then reverse calibrate the value of home production h s.t. the model produces steady state values that are consistent with eg. Walsh (2003 Walsh ( , 2005 calibrations. For the baseline calibration we set the marginal tax rate to = 0:25 and the tax subsidy = 0:03: The positive tax subsidy implies that income taxation is progressive. Finally, the replacement rate is set to = 0:2 and reverse calibration of the value of home production produces h = 0:53:
Household preferences-We follow Walsh (2005) for the utility function u (C t+i ) =
where is a parameter of habit persistence, and choose values for the parameters of household preferences that are standard in the literature. We set = 0:5, = 0:989 and the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion is chosen to be = 2: The steady state price markup for retail …rms is set to equal = 1:1 which implies " = 11;
which is the parameter that determines the elasticity of demand of di¤erentiated retail goods.
Price rigidity-The degree of price rigidity is determined by the share of …rms who do not optimally adjust their price. We follow Walsh (2003) and set this fraction to equal ! = 0:67:
Monetary policy-We set the parameters of the interest rate rule to equal = 1:10, which gives a 110 basis points long-run nominal response to a 100 basis point increase in in ‡ation, and R = 0:9 which is roughly consistent with the empirical evidence on high inertia displayed by central bank policy rules (Walsh 2005) .
Shock processes-We assume that the log aggregate productivity shock to follow an AR(1) process log z t = z log z t 1 + t with z = 0:95 and = 0:01: The standard deviation of the policy shock is set to t = 0:002:
Model analysis
We proceed by …rst analyzing the steady state of the model and the comparative statics of the labor market policy parameters. Then we move to the impulse response analysis to study the e¤ects of taxes on the dynamic behavior of the model. Marginal tax rate-Consider a marginal increase in the income tax rate . As home production (or leisure) is not taxed it's value relative to working increases making the latter less attractive. To restore the attractiveness of working the wage must be increased. Higher wages imply lower job creation and lower labor market tightness; less vacancies and more unemployed workers. Output falls as less people are employed and jobs are fewer.
Tax subsidy-Increasing the tax subsidy has opposite e¤ects to the marginal tax rate. The tax subsidy paid to an employed worker reduces the negotiated wage as the worker's employment is partly compensated by the tax subsidy. Bargaining implies that the …rm and worker share the subsidy. The reduction in the negotiated wage raises job creation, vacancies and labor market tightness. Unemployment falls as the job …nding probability for workers increases. Output increases.
Replacement ratio-A higher replacement rate increases the worker's unemployment income and threat point in the wage bargain. The wage increases with e¤ects similar to those of the marginal tax.
An alternative way to model taxes and the unemployment compensation scheme would be to follow e.g. Pissarides (1998) and Sinko (2005) by assuming that the net income of a worker with match speci…c productivity a it is (1 ) w it (a it z t ) + i.e. the tax subsidy is not subject to the marginal tax (in the benchmark case we assumed that employed workers receive a tax subsidy and are subsequently taxed for their total earnings, the subsidy included). The transfer from the worker to the tax authorities in the alternative setup is then 16
Unemployment compensation can be assumed to be either …xed or proportional to the average producitvity (without the tax subsidy)
The results presented above are qualitatively unambiguous and general and are not sensitive to the calibration of the model or speci…c policy setup. However, the particular policy setup does in ‡uence the quantitative e¤ects of the policy instruments. This is a feature to bear in mind when considering tax progression schemes.
Tax progression
We next examine the importance of the structure of taxes for the equilibrium values of the model. Keeping the government tax revenue …xed, we increase tax progression by increasing the marginal tax rate and then increase the tax subsidy so much that the change in tax revenue implied by the marginal tax raise is exhausted. Given the comparative statics of the marginal tax and tax subsidy described above, the e¤ects of increasing tax progression are ambiguous a priori, and depend on the relative magnitude of the e¤ects of the tax instruments.
Progressive taxes in initial equilibrium- Figure 2 shows how a revenue neutral increase in tax progression a¤ects the steady state of the economy in the benchmark calibration. The wage rate increases, inducing more job destruction, reducing labor market tightness and thus raising unemployment. Output decreases. The e¤ect of a tax revenue neutral increase in tax progression is qualitatively similar to an increase in the marginal tax. The e¤ect on the steady state values of the change in the marginal tax dominates the e¤ect of the tax subsidy. However the e¤ect of the marginal tax is moderated by the opposite e¤ect of the tax subsidy. A more progressive tax scheme thus shifts the economy to a lower output and higher unemployment equilibrium, so this tax structure involves a trade-o¤ between income equality considerations and equilibrium unemployment and output.
Proportional taxes in initial equilibrium-The above result is in contrast with the results of Pissarides (1998) and Sinko (2005) . In their studies increasing tax progression has a positive employment e¤ect, whereas we …nd a negative one. The key issue between these opposite reults is the initial degree of tax progression. Pissarides (1998) and Sinko (2005) consider the e¤ects of a tax revenue neutral increase in tax progression when taxation is initially proportional (the tax subsidy is zero), whereas we start from an initially progressive tax scheme. Experimenting with the policy instruments reveals that our model also produces qualitatively similar results to the above studies when taxation is proportional in the initial state. The smaller is the tax subsidy in the initial state, the smaller is the negative e¤ect of the marginal tax increase on employment relative to the positive e¤ect of the tax subsidy increase. For a su¢ ciently small tax subsidy the relative e¤ects are reversed and the employment e¤ect turns positive. The wage rate decreases with tax progression, inducing more job creation and vacancies, higher labor market tightness and lower unemployment. Output increases. In this case promoting income equality is consistent with lower equilibrium unemployment and higher output.
Our opposite results to those of Pissarides (1998) and Sinko (2005) show that the e¤ects of increasing tax progression depend on the initial degree of tax progression in the economy. Our results are not in con ‡ict with these studies, but completes them by empasizing the mechanism by which progression works. Our simulations show that, starting from a proportional tax scheme, the relative strength of the two tax policy instruments is reversed as progression increases. Initially the e¤ect of the tax subsidy dominates, but once the initial tax scheme is su¢ ciently progressive, the e¤ect of the marginal tax dominates. This implies that for economies with an initially low degree of tax progression, increasing it is bene…cial in terms of employment and output. But for economies with a su¢ ciently progressive tax scheme initially, increasing progression further is harmful in terms of employment and output.
Tax reform and shock propagation
Now we investigate how changes in labor market policy instruments a¤ect shock propagation. As in the previous section, our strategy is to …rst look at the e¤ect of policy parameters separately without government tax revenue considerations and then exam- ine tax revenue neutral changes in the tax structure.
Employment taxes and unemployment income
The e¤ects of the individual policy instruments on the impulse response functions to productivity and interest rate shocks are plotted by the solid lines in …gure 3 and Marginal tax rate-The impulse response functions of a productivity shock are generally ampli…ed by the marginal tax increase, but the shapes of the functions remain qualitatively the same. Both peak e¤ects are larger and the shocks are more persistent.
In fact, this e¤ect is similar to the e¤ect of reducing the bargaining power of workers described in Walsh (2003) . This should not be surprising, considering the discussion in section 2:2:4 on the way the marginal tax a¤ects the division of match surplus. A higher marginal tax increases the 'non market'component in the wage equation relative to the market sensitive part. This implies that the wage is more rigid and absorbs less of shocks, transmitting them on to the rest of the economy through job creation and destruction. The marginal tax a¤ects the impulse responses to an interest rate shock in a more diverse way. The impulse responses of output and employment are ampli…ed both in the peak e¤ect and persistence. The peak e¤ect of in ‡ation is moderated but the impulse response is more persistent. This applies to the labor market tightness and to the …rms and workers hazard rates as well.
Tax subsidy-The tax subsidy has the opposite e¤ect to the marginal tax rate. Replacement ratio-The replacement rate has qualitatively similar e¤ects to the marginal tax for similar reasons.
Tax progression
We now proceed to investigate the importance of the structure of taxation for the dynamics of the economy wrt. shocks. As in the steady state analysis we consider increasing the marginal tax rate and making the necessary increase in the tax subsidy to keep government tax revenues neutral. A general remark to be made is that the same forces are at work here as in the steady state analysis: the policy setup of the labor market determines the relative e¤ects of the tax parameters. to a productivity shock are smoother and less persistent, both in terms of peak e¤ects as well as persistence. In this alternative setup tax progression, or promoting income equality is consistent with a less volatile economy.
The implications of labor market policy depend crucially on the initial labor market policy scheme. As the marginal tax and the tax subsidy have opposite e¤ects, their relative strengths depend on the initial degree of tax progression. To achieve any desired goals by using tax policies should bear in mind the speci…c context in to which the policies are implemented.
Concluding remarks
We have examined the e¤ects labor taxation in a monetary business cycle model extended with search labor markets. The paper illustrates the importance of the initial state of the labor market in determining both the steady state and dynamic e¤ects of labor taxation. The main conclusion is that the macroeconomic outcomes of tax reforms depend on the initial degree of tax progression which determines the relative e¤ects of the tax instruments. In an economy with initially proportional labor taxation, increasing progression has desirable equilibrium employment and output e¤ects and stabilizing dynamic e¤ects. However, if the tax scheme is initially su¢ ciently progressive, increasing progression has opposite e¤ects: the equilibrium employment and output e¤ects are negative and the the sesitivity to shocks is ampli…ed.
Our simulations show that interactions of policy tools di¤er depending on the state of the labor market. As very di¤erent policy schemes are implemented in European countries and these countries have large variation in labor market outcomes, it would be of interest to study the implications of tax reforms in these di¤erent setups. Also, as a large set of policy instruments is available to the policy maker, a more comprehensive study including tools such as payroll taxes, hiring subsidies and …ring costs would o¤er more insight into the e¤ects of tax reforms and the alternatives available and trade-o¤s involved when designing tax reforms.
There are several issues that deserve attention in future research. We have in- Finally, an important issue in matching models is the ine¢ ciency typically produced by matching frictions and decentralized bargaining. An alternative approach to labor market policy is to design taxation so as to internalize search externalities and improve the e¢ ciency of resource allocation.. This question is also left for future work.
A Appendix
A.1 Bargaining and wage
The match surplus is shared between the …rm and the worker according to the parameter which represents the workers share of the match surplus (bargaining power).
The wage rate thus satis…es
The …rst order condition is given by
where @Jt(a it ) @wt = 1 and @Wt(a it ) @wt = 1 T 0 (w t ) so the …rst order condition becomes
Substituting the value equations and V t+1 = 0 into the …rst order condition and cancelling terms produces 1 T 0 (w t (a it z t )) w t (a it z t ) (54)
where we have used
given by the …rst order condition. Substituting equations (11) ; (12) and 
Re-express this as
Divide by p t Pt and rearrange
Multiply and divide the left side by P t
Then multiply both sides by p t and rearrange to obtain
where a fraction (1 !) adjusts price optimally and a fraction ! adjusts according to rule of thumb. We assume that …rm j uses a rule of thumb based on the most recently observed rate of in ‡ation and the most recently observed price level P t 1 , p jt = t 1 P t 1 :
To obtain an expression for aggregate in ‡ation, equations (58) and (59) can be approximated around a zero average in ‡ation steady state equilibrium.
A.3 Steady state equations
In steady state we have t = 0 and p t = P t = P and z t = z = 1: This implies that the household's Euler condition reduces to R = 1 and the steady state values of n; ; u; q f ; q w ; jc; ; w;ã; C and the policy variables T R; T and b are given by the steady state versions of equations (4) ; (5) ; (7) ; (8) ; (9) ; (10) ; (26) ; (23) ; (27) ; (29) ; (38) ; (11) and (12) Firm's hazard rate
Worker's hazard rate
Destruction rate 
Free-entry 
The steady-state price markup = " " 1 :
